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Abstract
The analysis of English Premier League clubs reliance on internal
versus external sources for new additions to the rst-team is motivated
by relevant labor economics literature. We consider two dimensions for
analysis: (i) the extensive margin that drives the selection of youth play-
ers in the rst team, and (ii) the intensive margin that looks at their
career lifespan once selected. Two uniquely created data sets are utilized
to establish robust results in support of the notion that more reputable
youth programs provide greater rst-team opportunities through internal
hiring. Foreign sourced players become more prevalent in the league after
the Bosman ruling, and their probability of selection is positively corre-
lated with club stature. Survival analysis results validate prior results
in terms of youth training reputation of certain clubs, and establishes a
presence of heterogeneity at youth club level that signals di¤erences in
player career prospects generated by their youth training. Further, when
the unobserved heterogeneity is modelled using discrete nite mixtures we
get new insights into the role unobservables in the analysis. In particular,
two types of players are identied in the data, one type that represents
33% is the one that drives the exits of the youth players. In addition,
this model shows that the Bosman ruling positively impacts the career
duration of youth players, as opposed to its negative e¤ect on rst-team
selection.
Key Words: internal promotion, external hiring, binary resposnse
models, Bosman ruling, duration models;
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1 Introduction
Internal promotion or external hiring is a dilemma faced by rms operating in
many distinct sectors of the economy. Heavy investment in training exposes
rms to the risk of losing the talented employees they trained to competitors
without exhausting the full benets of their investment. External hiring has its
own risks and uncertainties surrounding the workers ability to integrate e¤ec-
tively within the new rm. Unsurprisingly, this economic dilemma is encoun-
tered in professional sports around the globe, particularly in European football.
The football clubs in Europe make a spectrum of investment decisions that can
signicantly a¤ect their long-term success and nancial stability, but very few
are as important as deciding whether to invest heavily in their youth academies
or resort to the transfer market to recruit new players. Providing rst-team
opportunities to players developed in the youth academy can be viewed as pro-
moting from within, while hiring rst-team players from other sources can be
viewed as external hiring. The increasing importance of this dilemma is evi-
dent in the current market where transfer fees for star players are in excess of
100 million euros;1 Building a team by relying solely on the transfer market
is unimaginable even for the wealthiest of clubs. Developing and nurturing of
home-grown talent presents an alternative strategy that could be far less costly
but possibly more uncertain in terms of attaining su¢ ciently talented players in
the long-run. Most clubs these days, particularly in top European competitions,
rely on both streams for bringing in new players but the weighting of investment
in these two alternatives varies by club.
There are signicant risks associated with both options that vary by club size
and stature, which are further complicated by the transfer market for players
under contract in Europe. For example, and much like in any other sector of
the economy, football clubs may lose the youth players they developed to other
clubs, which could be troubling if their goal was to keep them and integrate
them in the rst-team. On the other hand, clubs can invest in youth academies
in order to generate prot from the sale of these players in the transfer market
if their focus is on prot maximization in the short-run, rather than on win
maximization. Bringing in players from external sources carries the inherent
risk of them not being able to t in to the new team and system, which can
1Gareth Bale was sold by Tottenham to Real Madrid for a fee that exceeded 100 million
euros. Luis Suarez was transferred from Liverpool to Barcelona for over 80 million euros,
while James Rodrigues went from Monaco to Real Madrid for around 90 million euros in the
summer of 2014.
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stem from their personal characteristics to professional ones. The scale of a club
and nancial resources available are an important determinant in these decisions
as well; Larger clubs have more options available in this regard, while smaller
clubs do not have the nancial ability to compete for talent in the transfer
market, which might dictate their decision to focus on the youth development
channel.
The Bosman ruling (December, 1995) in Europe certainly added an addi-
tional level of complexity in these decisions faced by clubs. The talent pool
available to clubs expanded signicantly as a result of the elimination of the
foreign player quota for players originating from EU countries. In addition,
players that were out of contract at their club were allowed to move for free
(without any transfer fees) to another club, which potentially exposed clubs to
greater risk in terms of losing the players they developed through the youth
system without any compensation. All of these changes brought interesting dy-
namics to the internal vs external hiring decisions of football clubs. Therefore,
examining the hiring patterns (or the extensive margin of the analysis) of top-
division clubs presents an analytical question worth exploring, especially in the
years surrounding the Bosman ruling.
Certain clubs have built a reputation of youth development and training
that emphasizes their focus and investment in this channel. Examples of world
renowned football academies include the likes of FC Barcelona and Real Madrid
in Spain, Bayern Munich in Germany, Ajax in Holland, Udinese in Italy, Sport-
ing Lisbon in Portugal, Arsenal in England, etc. The focus of this analysis
is on the English Premier League, where some of these most reputable youth
academies and football clubs reside. Radoman and Voia (2015) analyzed the
historical performance of youth players from 16 top-level English clubs in terms
of their career duration in top European leagues. This paper uses that infor-
mation to create a unique index for youth development reputation of the clubs
examined in the current study. In addition to this index and the original data
set, this paper creates a link between existing internal vs. external hiring la-
bor literature and a clubs decision to hire new players externally or resort to
their internal resources (their youth system). The index establishes an inher-
ent ranking in terms of reputation of youth programs among English Premier
League clubs, and the multi-stage empirical analysis solidies the theoretical as-
sumptions that more reputable clubs provide more opportunities to their youth
players. The behavior of clubs is analyzed in a specic period that accounts
for a major institutional change in the sport, the Bosman ruling. The club or-
3
dered results are consistent when controlling for the ruling, even though youth
sourced players were negatively a¤ected by this change in favor of foreign player
hires. Dominant, or more competitive, clubs (in terms of league performance)
have a higher probability of selecting foreign players in available rst-team slots,
which is amplied after the Bosman ruling. This result signals their superior
resources in the augmentation of their player-recruitment operations after the
institutional changes freed up the EU labor market for players. Furthermore,
survival analysis (intensive margin analysis) is performed that validates the in-
dex club reputation when it comes to career duration of youth products at the
top level of European football. One interesting result suggests that unobserved
heterogeneity is not present at player level, while it becomes a signicant factor
at the youth parent club level. This indicates that there is a unique schooling
aspect to each youth program that equips players with necessary skills for a
lengthy career at the top level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines
the theoretical motivation for the research task at hand, section 3 provides
an overview of the data generating process and an overall summary of the data,
section 4 describes the sequential empirical methodology employed, section 5
provides the extensive margin analysis results for the rst step independent
probit estimation, and of the second step bivariate probit estimation, section 6
describes the intensive margin analysis results of the survival analysis stage of
the empirical methodology and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
Applying certain labor market theory can aid in explaining the change in the
English Premier League competitive environment brought upon by this insti-
tutional change, and can explain the di¤erent behavior of clubs in these cir-
cumstances. One particular angle of labor economics is worth exploring from
a sports economics context, particularly European football; Internal promotion
versus hiring from external sources. A fundamental question is why do rms
invest in training of employees when they might lose them to competitors later
on? A similar question can be asked in European football regarding club in-
vestments in their youth academies when rst-team spaces are very limited and
they risk losing quality players that they trained and invested in.2 Waldman
2One recent example is Paul Pogba, a player brought up through Manchester Uniteds
youth system but who joined Juventus on a almost free transfer when his youth contract
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(2013) provides a survey of economic literature on this issue, focusing on ty-
ing economic theory with empirical evidence. Oyer (2007) argues that there
is an insider advantage in getting tenure for economic academic positions in
universities (outside the top-ten economic institutions), even though external
candidates are generally more productive.
DeVaro and Morita (2013) present a theoretical and empirical analysis of
internal promotion versus external recruitment for managerial positions, using a
cross section of British rms. They argue that a rms decision to hire managers
internally versus externally is inuenced by the size and the quality of the talent
pool available at the lower ranks, which is inherently determined by the rms
own hiring decisions. They argue that a rm with higher return to managerial
capability tries harder to ll the management positions by hiring internally, and
such rms hire more subordinates at lower levels and provide them with more
general training to increase the number of workers with managerial potential.
Therefore, these "bottom-heavy" employers have a greater probability of lling
their management positions through an internal hierarchy. According to the
authors, their theory potentially explains common empirical ndings that large
rms are more likely to hire CEOs internally than small rms. This logic is
applicable in the sports industry as well, and explains why certain clubs/teams
invest more heavily in their youth training programs, as well as coaching and
scouting at that level. Clubs that have built-up a reputation and a track record
in terms of youth training should have a higher probability of lling rst-team
spaces via internal sources, particularly from its own youth academy. Hence,
this type of labor market theory can be examined through the sports economics
perspective, and this paper does just that by examining English Premier League
clubs that endogenously determine their own hierarchical structure and weight
of investment in youth training.
This paper also builds on the results of Radoman and Voia (2015) and at-
tempts to assess whether clubs with high-performing youth programs maintain
their historical reputation and focus on youth players in a narrower time span.
What makes this analysis more interesting is that the time span examined en-
compasses the ever important Bosman ruling, and allows for testing its e¤ects
on the hiring behavior of English Premier league clubs. The Bosman ruling rep-
resents one of the most signicant external shocks in the history of European
sports and its e¤ects and implications have been the subject of analysis of many
expired. His current value exceeds 60 million euros, and Manchester United will not benet
at all from his talents or future transfers.
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academic studies. The English Premier league is considered to be the richest
among top European leagues in terms of club turnover and player salaries, espe-
cially after the Bosman ruling.3 This ensures a highly competitive environment
where top players from around the globe compete for rst-team spots and clubs
that have an abundance of choice in their scouting e¤orts. The high salaries in
the league attract world-class players, and the nancial resources available to
clubs do not constrain them in their player recruitment e¤orts as much as in
other European leagues.
In essence, the empirical analysis will attempt to address some important
questions that are applicable in a wider labor economics context: (i) Do more
youth-reputable (or bottom-heavy) clubs give greater opportunities to youth
players in their rst-team?, (ii) How is their behavior a¤ected by signicant
external shocks, such as institutional changes brought upon by the Bosman
case?, (iii) Are smaller clubs able to compete with larger clubs in acquiring
foreign talent, or does the Bosman ruling inherently change the focus on internal
versus external promotion for clubs of di¤erent scale?
3 Data and Summary Statistics
The data set is composed of 857 players that entered the English Premier League
for the rst time4 from the 1992/1993 to the 1999/2000 season. Relevant infor-
mation was gathered from publicly available internet sources, but mainly from
the following sites: http://www.worldfootball.net/, http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/en,
and http://www.soccerbase.com. The beginning of the data collection period
coincides with the establishment of the Premier League, and the seasons exam-
ined incorporate the e¤ects of the Bosman ruling, which occurred almost midway
through the analysis period. Players are distinguished by source of entry within
three categories: players coming from a clubs youth program ("Youth"), players
sourced from lower level5 domestic leagues ("Domestic"), and players sourced
from foreign leagues ("Foreign"). The data collected for each player also in-
3Please refer to Radoman (2015) for more details on the growing trends in European
football.
4 In fact, the data consists of all new entrants in the Premier League that made at least
one appearance in the rst team for the club that hired them. This is particularly important
when it comes to youth player because clubs have a number of youth players under contract at
any time, but only a few are given opportunities in the rst-team so this is a better measure
with this regard.
5Lower level leagues in England include: The Championship, League One, League Two,
etc.
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cludes: club/team that hired the player and the teams table position/ranking
in the league at that point, transfer fee paid for the players rights (applicable
only if players was sourced externally), players name, position, age, nationality,
whether the player entered before/after the Bosman ruling, international experi-
ence of player before entry,6 experience in top-level leagues outside of England,7
and the share of foreign players in the Premier League for each season. In ad-
dition, an index of youth training reputation is created using the results from
Radoman and Voia (2015) in order to examine the consistency of the results
and reputations of these clubs during the period a¤ected by the Bosman ruling.
Radoman and Voia based their analysis on 16 clubs and the ordinal index ap-
plied in this paper is generated as follows: category 1 clubs includes the top ve
clubs in terms of career duration of the players brought up through their youth
system,8 category 2 clubs includes youth programs ranked from 6-10,9 category
3 clubs contain the remaining clubs of the ones examined,10 and category 4
includes all clubs not examined. In addition, a separate youth ranking index is
created that includes Manchester United (Man U) in the rst category of youth
programs.11 The main reason behind this is that Man U changed their focus
on youth development before and during the study period, especially since the
arrival of their legendary manager, Sir Alex Ferguson in the late 80s, and their
historical ranking is not consistent with the current study period. In fact, Man
Us golden generation of youth players entered the market during this particu-
lar analysis period, so it could be problematic to group them in a lower-ranked
category. Another index is created (Team rank) to rank the clubs by their posi-
tion in the table to establish a certain grouping and di¤erences in club stature.
Clubs ranked in the top 7 positions of the Premier league table are grouped in
6Data is recorded if a player represented his country at junior or senior levels. If the player
represented his country at all levels, only the senior level is recorded because it is the highest
achievement attainable at the international level. Obviously, youth players generally do not
represent their countries at the senior level before they make a rst-team appearance for their
club so their highest attainable level is the junior level at that stage of their career.
7Players are di¤erentiated by their experience in a top-level league from Europe versus
experience in any other top-level league outside these leagues.
8The highest performing ve clubs (category 1) in all relevant model specications in
Radoman and Voia (2015) are: Arsenal, Liverpool, Tottenham, Leeds United, and West Ham.
9The clubs in this category include: Everton, Chelsea, Newcastle, Nottingham Forrest, and
West Brom.
10This category includes the lowest ranked from the 16 clubs examined: Manchester United,
Manchester City, She¢ eld Wednesday, Coventry City, Southampton, and Aston Villa.
11The original index created ranks Man U in category 3 youth programs based on historical
performance that does not account for this particular study period with su¢ cient weight.
Therefore, the index is modied to include Man U in the top category but as we will see later,
the results are not dependent on the index applied.
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category 1, while clubs ranked in positions 8-15 are grouped in category 2, and
the bottom 5 ranked clubs are considered category 3 clubs. The logic behind
the ranking is that the top 7 places in the league lead to places in European
competitions, which are generally occupied by the most competitive clubs in
the league; the bottom 5 clubs are typically the ones ghting for survival in
the league by avoiding relegation, and the rest of the clubs can be considered
mid-ranking clubs.
Out of the total of 857 players, 357 entered in the pre-Bosman period, while
500 entered in the post-Bosman period. These entries can be broken down
further by player source; In the pre-Bosman period there were a total of 131
Domestic entries, 147 Youth player entries, and 79 player entries from Foreign
sources, while in the post-Bosman period there were 110 Domestic entries, 149
Youth entries, and 241 Foreign source entries. Unsurprisingly, the number of
foreign player entries increased signicantly (more than tripled) as a result of the
removal of the foreign player quota and foreign player entries represented nearly
half of all new entrants to the Premier League in the post-Bosman period versus
close to 25% in the pre-Bosman period. It appears that players sourced from
Domestic sources su¤ered the most as a result of the Bosman ruling in terms of
opportunities in the Premier League; they represented 37% of player entries in
the pre-Bosman period versus 22% in the post-Bosman period. Players sourced
from Youth academies were least a¤ected in terms of absolute entries, but their
relative percentage of entries was reduced by around 11% as well. It appears
that increased competition resulting from the ruling negatively impacted players
sourced domestically and in general, clubs were willing to take on greater risks
in terms of giving opportunities to unproven players in the Premier League as
the total number of new entrants increased signicantly.
Table 1 breaks down the pre and post Bosman entries by player source in
more detail. Looking at the youth program ranking index we can see a shift
in hiring patterns for clubs in all categories as a result of the Bosman ruling.
The availability of foreign talent in the post-Bosman period resulted in a sig-
nicant shift towards foreign players for all clubs in the study. It appears that
experience in foreign leagues outweighs all other factors associated with un-
proven players in the Premier League. Consistent with the motivating theory,
top ranked youth programs (category 1) continued to give the most rst-team
opportunities to unexperienced youth players, but this percentage went down
from 55% to 33% as a result of the Bosman ruling. This percentage went down
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from 32% to 23% for category 2 clubs, and from 47% to 24% for category 3
clubs. Domestically sourced players su¤ered the most in terms of rst-team op-
portunities, particularly at top ranked youth programs, who substituted away
from them and youth players (to a lesser extent) towards foreign players. The
hiring patterns changed at the position level as well; Domestically and Youth
sourced players were given more opportunities in the defensive positions in the
post-Bosman period, rather than in the mideld and forward positions. It ap-
pears that the more technical positions (M and F), where a higher level of ball,
dribbling, passing and shooting skills are required, were allocated to players
sourced from foreign leagues. This is consistent with certain viewpoints that
foreign players are more technically adept than domestic players in the English
Premier League. Furthermore, looking at the hiring patters by club ranking we
can see that top ranked clubs (in terms of table standings) shifted the most to-
wards foreign players. When we consider teams ranked lower in the table, their
reliance on foreign players increased as well but to a lesser extent than for top
ranked clubs; This is particularly true for the lowest ranked club category who
were fairly consistent in terms of the rst-team opportunities given to players
from all three sources. This might signal the much larger resources available to
higher ranked clubs that allow them to expand their scouting networks without
limits that could be constraining lower ranked clubs. Lower ranked clubs are
usually unable to compete for top talent with more reputable clubs, and the
process of establishing a scouting network for unproven or unknown foreign tal-
ent is very time and resource consuming. Therefore, this suggests that larger
clubs were able to shift and/or reallocate their internal resources more quickly
and e¢ ciently than lower ranked clubs, as a result of the Bosman ruling.
Focusing on players sourced from youth programs, representing a nation at
the junior international level (typically at the U21, U19, or U18 levels) becomes
more prevalent for new entrants in the post-Bosman era. In the pre-Bosman
period of this study, 45 out 147 youth players made international appearances
prior to making a rst-team appearance in the Premier League, while this is
the case for 71 out of 149 youth players in the post-Bosman period. Table 2
breaks this analysis down further by the youth program ranking of the clubs in
this study. Category 1 ranked youth programs maintained their reputation in
terms of producing and giving rst-team opportunities to youth internationals.
Being an youth-level international became increasingly important to earn rst-
team opportunities in lower ranked youth programs as well, which signals an
intensied competitive landscape in the Premier League after the Bosman ruling
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that lters out top youth talent more e¢ ciently.
4 Methodology
The primary objective of this study is to assess whether clubs with more rep-
utable youth programs (in terms of career duration of their graduates) actually
provide greater rst-team opportunities to their youth trainees, with a focus on
the years surrounding the Bosman ruling. The secondary objective is to exam-
ine whether the reputation established in Radoman and Voia (2015)12 upholds
using this data set, especially in the wake of a major institutional change in
the sport. To achieve this, a methodology that builds on a sequence of steps is
developed.
The rst step (the extensive margin analysis) uses probability models to iden-
tify factors that are important in providing rst-team opportunities to youth
and foreign players, separately. After doing this, the selection problem is mod-
elled as a choice among three possible alternatives. The second step estimates a
multinomial logit model structuring the dependent variable as a choice among
three possible alternatives. The third and nal step (the intensive margin analy-
sis) involves the use of survival analysis to examine the career duration patterns
of youth trainees in this data set and determine the appropriateness of prior
studies in this particular time-frame.
4.1 Extensive Margin Analysis
4.1.1 Probit Analysis
The task is to estimate a model that characterizes the probabilities of hiring,
or specically giving rst-team opportunities to youth and foreign players. The
observation of youth rst-team selection is characterized as a binary variable,
Yi, where:
Yi = f10 if a youth player is selected.otherwise. (1)
The realization of Yt is used to dene a latent utility measure of youth
selection, Y i . Given the available data, this latent utility can be modelled as:
Y i = Xi + v; (2)
12 It is important to note that there is very little overlap, less than 10%, in this data vs. the
data utilized by Radoman and Voia (2015).
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where Xi represents a set of variables with player characteristics, club in-
formation, and certain macro information that might be relevant for youth se-
lection, which is further explained in the subsequent model specications esti-
mated. The error term, v, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean
zero and constant variance, 2v. Under this assumption of normality, the model
becomes a probit model and can be estimated using the reduced form:
Yt = (Xi) + v (3)
where (Xi) is the cumulative density function (CDF) associated with the
normal distribution.
The probability of foreign player selection,Fi, is modelled in a similar fashion:
Fi = f10 if a foreign player is selected.otherwise. (4)
The realization of Fi is used to dene a latent utility measure of the proba-
bility of foreign player selection by an English Premier League club, F i . Given
the available data, the following model is employed:
F i = Di + u; (5)
where Di represents a set of variables with player characteristics, club in-
formation, and certain macro information that might be relevant for youth se-
lection, which is further explained in the subsequent model specications esti-
mated. The error term, u, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean
zero and constant variance, 2u. Under this assumption of normality, the model
becomes a probit model and can be estimated using the reduced form:
Fi = (Di) + u (6)
where (Di) is a CDF associated with the normal distribution.
Three separate probit specications are estimated for youth players being
selected in the rst-team by their respective clubs:
 M1: accounts for ranking of players youth program (Youthranking), share
of foreigners in the league (forshare) at the time of entry, players position,
and a constant term.
 M2: M1 plus a dummy variable controlling for entry pre or post the
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Bosman ruling (Bosman) and the relevant international experience (Inter.
Exp.) of the player at the time of entry.
 M3: essentially M2 with the addition of Manchester United to category 1
youth programs.
Two separate probit specications are estimated for foreign players being
given a rst-team opportunity by clubs in the English Premier League during
the study period:
 M1: accounts for team ranking (Team ranking) for the club making the
rst-team selection, the age of the player at entry (Age), player posi-
tion, dummy variable controlling for entry pre or post the Bosman ruling
(Bosman) and a constant term.
 M2: M1 plus a control for a players market value at the time of trans-
fer/acquisition (Transfer Value), and his relevant experience at the inter-
national level (Inter. Exp.) at the time of entry.
Before moving on to the next stage, the models in (1) to (5) are tested
for specication error and t, under the assumption that the two events arise
separately. For robustness purposes, the marginal e¤ects of the parameters in
estimated models were compared to the ones under a logit representation that
assumes a cumulative standard logistic distribution instead; even though the
coe¢ cients were di¤erent, the marginal e¤ects in the two models were similar
as one would expect. The joint signicance of the Youthranking category coef-
cients, as well as the Team ranking coe¢ cients in the foreign selection model,
was conducted using the common Wald test.
Furthermore, the threat posed by heteroskedastic error terms in probit esti-
mations has been documented well academia, particularly in Williams (2009).
This could be particularly concerning if the basic model is misspecied. While
this is a problem that researchers should at least address, there is no consis-
tent remedy that is implemented in practice. Nevertheless, this paper estimates
a maximum-likelihood heteroskedastic probit model ala Harvey (1976), which
is a generalization of the probit model that relaxes the assumption of the ho-
moskedastic error term in the probit model. The results indicate that there is no
evidence of heteroskedasticity in the error terms in the probit models estimated.
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4.1.2 Multinomial Logit Analysis
Up until now, the clubs selection problem has been modelled as a binary choice
of hiring youths (or foreigners) versus players from all other streams. In fact,
there are three possible sources for clubs to utilize when selecting unproven
newcomers to the English Premier League; internal (youth stream), and an
external stream that can be broken down by players sourced from foreign leagues
and players sourced from lower-level domestic leagues. The data accounts for
all three sources, and allows for estimation where the dependent variable is
categorical:
yj = f1 if y=j0 if y 6=j (7)
The multinomial logit model is typically applied in this type of situation,
where the probability that club j selects alternative j is:
pij = p(yi = yj) =
exp(Z
0
ij)
mP
k=1
exp(Z
0
ik)
; (8)
where Zi represents a set of explanatory variables described below, and
j represents a set of coe¢ cients estimated for di¤erent alternatives (player
sources). One set of coe¢ cients is normalized to zero and coe¢ cients of other
alternatives are interpreted in reference to this base outcome, which is repre-
sented by domestically sourced players in this paper.13 The inferences from
one model would be identical to the other if the baseline comparison category
changes. Two multinomial logit specications are estimated and reported:
 M1: Includes categorical variables for youth program ranking (Youthrank-
ing), club positional ranking (Team ranking), international experience
(Int. Exp.), share of foreigners at time of entry (forshare), and dummy
variables for the Bosman ruling (Bosman) and player position.
 M2: M1 with the inclusion of Man U in the top ranked Youthranking
variable.
A stringent assumption of multinomial logit models is that outcome cate-
gories for the model have the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). A general implementation of the Hausman specication test is used to
13Depending on which alternative is selected as the base category, the estimated coe¢ cients
will be di¤erent but the marginal e¤ects will be the same regardless of the base category.
13
test for the validity of IIA, which tests for any systematic di¤erences in the
coe¢ cient estimates from the estimated equations. Under the IIA assumption,
we would expect no systematic change in the coe¢ cients if we excluded one
of the outcomes from the model. Violation of the IIA assumption can lead to
ine¢ cient estimates. The parameters are re-estimated by excluding each of the
three alternatives, and a Hausman test is performed against the full model. An-
other aspect worth considering is that the multinomial logit estimates several
equations and requires a larger sample size than a binary choice model; given
the sample size here, it might be more appropriate to interpret the results from
the binary probit estimations.
In addition to the joint signicance test for the Youthranking coe¢ cients, a
Wald test is performed to test for the equality of these coe¢ cients across the
estimated equations.
4.2 Intensive Margin Analysis
4.2.1 Survival Analysis
In addition to the contents described earlier, the data extends to capture the
entire career path for the youth players entering the market during the study
period. Most of their observable statistics for each season at the top-tier of major
European leagues14 are captured, including: appearances, minutes per game,
goals, assists (when available), yellow and red cards, international appearances,
international minutes per game, each club that a player represents, the clubs
ranking, each transfer during the career and fee paid for the player, exit from
the league and reason for exit,15 etc. This type of detail allows for a substantial
survival analysis that tests the reliability of prior results by Radoman and Voia
(2015) in this narrow time frame that captures the ever-important Bosman
ruling. The duration analysis in this paper also serves to reinforce the credibility
of the youth ranking index. A dummy variable is created to capture the top
5 ranked youth programs from the prior study (category 1 clubs described in
the Data section), and analyze their reputation and ability to produce higher
quality players in terms of career duration at the top level of European football,
as compared to lower ranked programs. Consistent with the previous section, a
second dummy variable is created that includes Man U in the top-rated youth
14 In addition to the English Premier league, major European leagues are considered to be:
Spanish La Liga, German Bundesliga, Italian Serie A, and French Ligue 1.
15Players exiting due to injury are excluded from the sample to generate more reliable
estimates that are not impacted by health or related issues.
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programs for this particular study period to assess if this alters the results and
conclusions in any way.
Wilcoxon and Log-rank tests are performed on the data to test for observed
subgroup di¤erences in the survivor functions of players arising from the more
reputable versus less reputable youth programs, and the results suggest that
there are di¤erences. Figure 1 illustrates the sub-group di¤erences in terms
of smoothed empirical hazards. The empirical survivor function (the empirical
hazard function) is higher (lower) at all times for youth players originating from
more reputable youth academies,16 which lends support to previous studies and
provides foundations for a more formal modelling approach.
Survival analysis is based on duration models that are used to estimate
the hazard rate. The hazard rate, or the instantaneous probability of exit, is
estimated using a semiparametric Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model.17 The
Cox PH model makes no assumptions about the distribution of survival times
and is robust to misspecication of the baseline hazard. A typical semiparametric
model is of the form:
hi(tijxi; vi) = (xi)(ti); (9)
where  (xi) = exp(xi) is a function of the observable time-invariant covari-
ates, and  (ti) is the nonparametric baseline hazard for individual player i.
The Therneau-Grambsch test for the PH assumption, which is based on scaled
Schoenfeld residuals, is applied both globally and at specic covariate level for
each specication estimated and the results indicate that there is no evidence
the PH assumption is violated. The nonlinearity of covariates is tested for by ap-
plying cubic spline functions, and this nonparametric technique does not result
in any changes in the assumed linear functional form of the covariates.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) can result in misspecica-
tion for several reasons. However, the magnitude of biases in non-frailty models
is reduced when we allow for a fully exible specication for the baseline hazard,
like in the Cox model. It is important to note that if the frailty e¤ect is real,
the PH model loses its normal proportional hazards property because the haz-
ard ratios are now conditional on the unobserved frailty. Most scholars suggest
that interpreting the sign and signicance of the coe¢ cients should be the limit
16This di¤erence would be even greater if Man U was included in the more reputable group
(Youthrank = 1).
17For a detailed description of possible models that could be employed and all of the sta-
tistical tests mentioned in this subsection, please refer to Radoman and Voia (2015).
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for substantive interpretation of frailty models. Nevertheless, frailty models are
estimated using the Gamma distribution for unobserved heterogeneity:
g(v) =
v
1
 1 exp( v )
 ( 1 )
1

(10)
Three di¤erent specications are estimated using the Cox model:
 M1: Includes a dummy variable for more reputable youth programs (with-
out Man U), performance measures (appearances (Apps), international
appearances (Intapps), average minutes played per game (Mpg), goals
scored (Goals), yellow cards obtained (Yellow), per season), dummy con-
trol for entering pre or post the Bosman ruling (Bosman), and position
played by the player.
 M2: M1 with the inclusion of Man U in the more reputable youth program
category.
 M3: M2, additionally accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
We test the presence of endogeneity bias using the test proposed in Huynh,
Petrunia and Voia (2010)18 by examining the potential correlation between ob-
servables and unobservables in our youth career duration analysis. The test is
seen as informative and not a test that measures the actual bias, but the exis-
tence of bias on a relation that links our observables to a transformed measure
of time that models an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT). In other words we test
if there are remaining unobservables that are correlated to our observables in
an AFT hazard model. The presence of endogeneity in this model may signal
the presence of endogeneity in other transformed outcome measures of time, in
particular proportional hazard (PH) models that are considered here. The non-
linearity of the functional form of the PH models may alleviate the presence of
bias in AFT models. Therefore, we expect if endogeneity is present in an AFT
hazard model to have a smaller impact in a PH model. The actual test is based
on a split sample test and is summarized as follows: Coe¢ cients are broken
into parameters of interest (1) and the nuisance parameters (2).^
(1)
1 denotes
the estimate for the parameters of interest from the rst sub-sample. The null
hypothesis H0 concerns the parameters of interest and allows the nuisance pa-
rameter to remain unknown. In this case, the null hypothesis is H0 : 1 = ^
(1)
1
18The Details of applying this test are found in Huynh, Petrunia and Voia (2010).
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or that the coe¢ cients are the same across the split samples. To test H0 us-
ing the second sample, the estimates from the rst sample are considered as
being the true parameters. Signicant results on parameters estimates in the
second sub-sample regression may signal the presence of remaining unobserved
heterogeneity in the model that needs to be controlled.
To address the remaining issue we propose to use a discrete nite mixture
hazard model that removes the parametrization of the unobserved heterogeneity
that was used in the PH models and replaces it with mass points as proposed by
Heckman and Singer (1984). In particular we use the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978)
discrete nite mixture (DFM) hazard model implemented by JenkinsSTATA
program. The model assumes that each observation belongs to one of several
types, each type having its own distribution, which is collapsed to a mass point.
Consider the following hazard model:
hi(tijxi; vi) = 1  exp( exp(vi + b0 + xi)); (11)
where v is the unobserved heterogeneity. Now, consider the unobserved het-
erogeneity has K discrete points (v = fv1; v2; :::; vKg); with probabilities p =
fp1; p2; :::; pK 1; pK = 1  p1   p2   :::  pK 1g.
To estimate the parameters of interest  = (p1; p2; :::; pK 1; v1; v2; : : : ; vK ; ; b0),
the log-likelihood function for DFM model is used and it is found in Jenkins
(1995).
By replacing the unobserved heterogeneity that was modeled as a random
e¤ect with and unobserved heterogeneity modelled as mass points we allow for
a nonparametric specication of the unobserved heterogeneity, which is more
exible than the parametric specication used in the Cox hazard model. There-
fore, with this specication we expect to further reduce the bias if endogenity
is present in our original model specication.
5 Extensive Margin Analysis Results:
Separate probit estimation is conducted for the probability of selection of play-
ers sourced internally (youth) and from foreign leagues. The main assumption
of independent estimation is that the error terms in the two models are not
correlated. This notion will be tested in the next section, where these inde-
pendent specications are nested in a bivariate probit model that accounts for
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correlation in the unobservables.
5.1 Youth Selection
Table 3 presents the results of three probit specications for youth selection.
Looking at the log likelihood for each specication, there is a signicant im-
provement when moving from M1 to either M2 or M3. Consequently, the AIC
and BIC model t statistics show a signicant improvement when moving from
M1 to M2/M3.19 Controlling for the Bosman ruling and player experience at
the international level improves the model specication substantially. Including
Man U in the category 1 youth programs (M3) improves the log likelihood only
slightly from M2, but the signicance of the youth program ranking coe¢ cients
is signicantly improved to the point that all categories are signicant at the
1% level.
The results support the theoretical intuition that youth players arising from
better ranked youth programs have a higher probability of being selected in the
rst-team of their parent club. Panel A of table 6 provides the predicted proba-
bilities associated with arising from the four di¤erently ranked youth programs
from M3; the results indicate that category 1 clubs have a 14-15% higher prob-
ability of selecting a youth player in their rst-team than lower ranked youth
programs. These clubs invest more heavily in their youth academies and could
be assumed to be more bottom-heavy, so players arising from their youth pro-
grams have a higher probability of being promoted to the rst-team. The results
lend support to the theory that more bottom-heavy, or youth oriented in this
case, clubs provide greater opportunities for higher-level positions (rst-team)
to employees from internal sources. The unique youth ranking index created in
this paper measures the degree of bottom-heavinessby Premier League clubs,
and the estimated results are aligned with the index ranking of clubs in terms
of opportunities provided to internally sourced players. What could be just as
important is that the youth training reputation of these clubs is consistent in the
wake of a major institutional change, the Bosman ruling, that presented clubs
in Europe with more options in their talent search and strategic/optimization
decisions. Even though the overall rst-team opportunities to youth players be-
came scarcer in all clubs, the higher ranked youth programs continued to provide
more opportunities to internally sourced players relative to lower ranked clubs.
19The AIC for M1 is 1098, 867 for M2 and 863 for M3. Similarly, BIC for M1 is 24, -194
for M2 and -198 for M3. Both of these criteria suggest that lower values correspond to better
model t.
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Similar results are obtained from M2, except that category 2 youth programs
do not have a signicant coe¢ cient at a reasonable level of signicance.
Looking at the players position e¤ect on selection, the benchmarking was
based on the goaltender position but that positions representation in the data
was by far the smallest so one has to be careful with the interpretation of these
results. There is only one available slot on the rst-team for a goaltender versus
other positions that have multiple slots available for rotation, and goaltenders
tend to be replaced less often than the other positions. The results indicate that
youth players are most often selected in the mideld and defensive positions and
least often in the forward position, even though the coe¢ cient for forwards is
not signicant at any reasonable level. This suggests that foreign (or other)
sources are used more often for the most scrutinized and demanding position in
European football, the forward position. The e¤ect of the share of foreign play-
ers in the league (forshare) changes signs when moving from M1 to M2 or M3,
and it increases in signicance as well. Controlling for the Bosman ruling alters
the sign of this covariate and results indicate there is a positive e¤ect on youth
selection with increases in the share of foreigners in the league. The coe¢ cient
for the Bosman ruling was negative and signicant at the 1% level, as antici-
pated. This indicates, in general, that youth players have a lower probability
of being selected after the ruling, which is not surprising considering the talent
pool available for clubs to draw from increased signicantly as a result of this
institutional change. However, the more important result here is that the more
reputable youth clubs provided more opportunities through internal promotion
even in the presence of this external shock. There is a signicant e¤ect of inter-
national experience on youth player selection as well. The negative correlation
between international experience at the senior level and youth selection is not
surprising because youth player do not have this sort of experience typically
at their tender age. However, and more importantly, international experience
at the junior levels has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect (at the 1%
level) on youth selection that is not too di¤erent in M2 and M3. This indi-
cates the youth players with international experience at junior levels provide a
strong signal to their employers about their potential and future inclusion in
the rst-team.
Tables 4 and 5 outline the tests performed on the appropriateness of model
specication and a measure of t. In table 4 t is measured by comparing the
mean and standard deviation of actual youth selection against the correspond-
ing moments implied by the estimated probit model. The results indicate a
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close match between the two distributions, with the means being almost identi-
cal. Table 5 provides the test of misspecication error for the estimated model.
The joint signicance test for the Youthranking coe¢ cients indicates they are
statistically di¤erent from zero. The test regresses the link function of the out-
come variable (the probability function) on the predicted probability and the
predicted probability squared. The intuition is that the predicted probabil-
ity function should be statistically signicant unless the model is misspecied.
Proper specication also implies that the squared probability should not have
predictive power. The associated link test supports the specication of the
model at the 1% level of signicance, while indicating that the squared predic-
tion is not signicant at any reasonable level.20 There is no indication that the
model is misspecied.
5.2 Foreign Selection
Table 7 presents the results of two probit specications for foreign source selec-
tion of players. In terms of log likelihood, there is a signicant improvement
when moving to M2 from M1. Correspondingly, the AIC and BIC statistics are
both much lower for M2, 648 and -442 respectively, than for M1, 836 and -267,
respectively. Model specication is improved when controlling for additional
factors, including a players market (transfer) value and his experience at the
international level at the time of entry.
The results indicate that a clubs ranking/grouping in the table signicantly
a¤ects the probability of a foreign player being selected in the rst-team. The
ordering of the team ranking coe¢ cients suggests that higher ranked clubs, or
those ghting for the league title or a place in European competitions, have a
tendency to hire and play more foreigners in their rst-team than lower-ranked
clubs. Panel B of table 6 outlines the predicted probabilities for the team rank-
ing covariate; clubs ranked in the rst tier have an 11% greater probability
of selecting players from foreign sources than clubs ranked in the second tier,
and 15% greater probability than clubs ranked in the third and bottom tier.
Higher ranked clubs are typically nancially superior, and this indicates that
their nancial strength allows them to rely on external sources (i.e. the transfer
market) for new additions to the rst-team. This could be an indication that
lower-ranked clubs, which can be assumed to be less well-o¤ nancially, can-
20M2 and M3 results indicate that the model is not misspecied at the 1% level of signi-
cance. However, M1s results are indicative only at the 10% level, which further outlines the
improvement in specication when controlling for additional covariates.
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not compete for talent in the transfer market with larger clubs, even after the
Bosman ruling. One would assume that larger clubs had more of an advantage
in terms of securing talent from external sources prior to the Bosman ruling
when the quota for foreign players restricted the amount of spots for them in
the rst-team. However, it appears that the removal of the quota did not close
the gap among these di¤erently ranked clubs in terms of their ability to scout
abroad. In fact, the gap grew even further in favor of larger clubs signalling
their ability to adapt to the new environment more e¢ ciently.
The age of the foreign sourced player has a positive and statistically sig-
nicant (at the 1% level) e¤ect on selection in the rst team. This suggests
that experience in foreign leagues is valued more than raw potential of youth by
Premier League clubs, when hiring foreign players. Interestingly, the position
dummies lose signicance when we move from M1 to M3. M2 results indicate
that foreign players are recruited more at the most technical positions, mid-
eld and forwards, which is consistent with the patters described in the data
section of this paper. Players are selected from foreign sources at the forward
position with greatest probability. However, as we move to a better specied
model (M3), the loss in signicance of these position coe¢ cients renders them
irrelevant for interpretation purposes. The Bosman ruling has a strong and
predictable positive e¤ect on foreign player selection, meaning that their prob-
ability of selection by one of the Premier League clubs increased signicantly
after the ruling. The positive e¤ect does diminish as we improve model spec-
ication in M3. In addition, a foreign players market (transfer) value has a
positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on his rst-team selection; the higher
the players transfer value, the higher the probability he gets an opportunity in
the rst-team. A players senior international experience for his country signals
his quality and has a predictable positive e¤ect on his selection, statistically
signicant at the 1% level.
The goodness of t and misspecication tests are conducted in the same
fashion as for selection of youth players, but the resulting tables are not re-
ported. There is a close match between the mean and standard deviation of
actual foreign player selection against the corresponding moments implied by
the estimated probit model, which indicates a good t of the model. In addition,
the link test for both specications indicates that the models are not misspec-
ied at the 1% level of statistical signicance. The joint signicance test for
the Team ranking coe¢ cients indicates that they are statistically di¤erent from
zero.
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5.3 Multinomial Logit Results
In this type of model, we have an unordered categorical dependent variable. The
basic idea is that the decision by clubs to hire new and unproven Premier League
players from internal or external sources encompasses three possible choices: (i)
players from their own youth system, (ii) players sourced from lower leagues,
and (iii) players sourced from lower-level domestic leagues. The independent
probit modelled youth or foreign selection as a binary choice between internal
promotion and external hiring, while the multinomial logit breaks down the
externally sourced players in two separate groups for a total of three alterna-
tives available to clubs. The results are structured and interpreted against the
base alternative, which consists of domestically sourced players from lower-level
leagues.
Table 8 outlines the estimation results for youth and foreign sources vs. the
base domestic source, and the interpretation here relates to the top panel of
the data, which represents the intended segment of the research at hand. The
youth program ranking is highly statistically signicant for all categories in the
index for players sourced internally (Youth), with category 2 being signicant
at the 5% level and all others at the 1% level. The negative coe¢ cients indicate
that the relative log odds of youth selection vs. domestically sourced players
decreases by 1.20 if the youth player originates from a category 4 vs. category
1 youth training program. Once again, this result reiterates the independent
probit results that the probability of youth selection is higher at higher ranked
youth clubs. Panel C of Table 6 provides the predicted probabilities of youth
selection for clubs in all four youth ranking categories for M2; youth players
originating from category 1 youth programs have a 31% probability of being
selected in the rst-team, while the next highest category has a 22% probability
of youth selection. These results are consistent with the independent probit
results for youth selection, and similar reasoning is applicable relevant to the
motivating theory. The player position dummies are statistically signicant for
both specications, indicating that youth players have the highest probability of
being selected in mideld position vs domestically sourced players. Representing
a country in the junior ranks has a predictable and statistically signicant e¤ect
on the probability of youth selection, as it provides a strong signal about a
players ability and potential. Unsurprisingly, the Bosman dummy is negative
and statistically signicant (at the 1% level) implying the ruling had a negative
e¤ect on youth selection.
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In terms of log-likelihood, there isnt much di¤erence in the two specications
indicating that the results are robust and interpretation is similar whether Man
U is included in category 3 or 1. Both specications t the data well in terms
of improvement in log-likelihood from a baseline or constant only model. The
improvements in the signicance are also evident in the AIC and BIC criteria
when we move towards the M1 and M2 specications from the baseline model.
Joint signicance of the Youthrank coe¢ cients in all equations indicates the
overall e¤ect of the youth ranking index is statistically signicant at the 1% level.
In addition, there is no evidence that the coe¢ cients in the estimated equations
are di¤erent.21 The marginal e¤ects of the youth ranking index categories are all
statistically signicant and consistent with the ranking implied by the index for
M2. This is particularly important because much like the estimated probabilities
listed in Table 6, these e¤ects do not vary with the choice of the base category
for comparisons, unlike the displayed coe¢ cients (log-rank ratios) that di¤er for
each chosen base category.
Considering the goodness of t, there is a close match between the rst and
second moments from the actual selections and the ones implied by the estimated
multinomial logit model.22 Upon examining the output from the Hausman test,
there is no evidence that the IIA assumption has been violated in any of the
scenarios tested.
6 Intensive Margin Analysis: Survival Analysis
Results
The results of the semiparametric estimations are presented in Table 9. There
isnt much di¤erence in log likelihoods of M1 and M2, but the frailty specica-
tion (M3) signicantly improves the likelihood of the model. The evidence of
unobserved heterogeneity is statistically signicant, but only at the 10% level.
The estimated parameter , a measure of heterogeneity or overdispersion, is
0.06. Typically, a lower measure of heterogeneity is preferred, and the lower it
is the more reliable the interpretation of the estimated hazard ratios becomes.
Therefore, the rather low value of the overdispersion and its statistical signi-
cance allow for a more reasonable interpretation of the results. Nonetheless, the
21This is true for all of the estimated coe¢ cients, as well as for the youth ranking index
tested independently.
22The results are similar to Table 4 results, and are not presented in the paper.
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results will be interpreted in terms of M1 and M2, but the general conclusions
are consistent among all specications.
Players originating from a more reputable youth program have an exit proba-
bility that is 19% (26%) lower in M1 (M2) than players from the rest of the youth
programs considered here, which is statistically signicant in all specications.
This result validates the empirical observations and the benchmark results from
Radoman and Voia (2015). Youth program participation and training has an
impact on a players career path, and duration at the top-level of European foot-
ball. The performance measures have a statistically signicant and predictable
negative e¤ect on the hazard rate in all specication: each additional appear-
ance per season reduces the exit probability for a player by 4%, an additional
10 minutes spent on the pitch per game decreases the exit probability by 6-7%,
each international appearance reduces the exit probability by 16-17%, and each
goal scored decreases the exit probability by 13%. The disciplinary measure,
yellow cards, presents an interesting and statistically signicant result, which
indicates that an additional yellow card per season increases the exit probabil-
ity by 7%. This means that more disciplined players will tend to have longer
careers as this is a valued player virtue among Premier League clubs, which is
that much more important for youth players in the tender and early years of
their careers. The Bosman ruling dummy is not signicant at any reasonable
level. Out of the four positions considered, it is not surprising that goaltenders
tend to have the longest careers. The dummies for defenders and midelders
are signicant (at the 5% and 10% level, depending on the model) and suggest
that defenders have a lower exit probability than midelders, while the forward
dummy is not signicant. This suggests that youth players occupying positions
that require lower technical skills have longer careers at the top level.
The results indicate that unobserved heterogeneity is not statistically sig-
nicant at the player level, but it is signicant at the youth program (team)
level, which is presented in M3. This suggests that there is something unique to
each youth program, rather than at a player talent level. At least it can be said
that youth sourced players in this sample, who made at least one appearance
in the Premier League, appear to be fairly homogenous, while their youth-club
training generates heterogeneity among them that could be a deciding factor in
their careers.
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6.1 Robustness Analysis-Tests
A set of informal and formal tests are used to check the robustness of the results.
In particular we plot the estimated hazard measurers against the empirical haz-
ard measure that is computed from the data and see how close are the prediction
to the actual data. Figure 2 displays the baseline hazards of all three speci-
cations, which show that duration dependence is modelled adequately by all
models in terms of mimicking the slope of the empirical hazard. Figure 3 shows
the estimated hazards for M2 and M3, with M1 omitted due to its nearly iden-
tical alignment with M2. Both specications slightly underpredict the empirical
hazard and are fairly close to each other, with M2 being marginally higher and
closer to the empirical hazard.
In addition to the visual techniques, other tests are considered. In partic-
ular Cox-Snell residuals are used to assess the goodness of t for M1 and M2,
which provided evidence of satisfactory t of the data. In addition to the analy-
sis of Cox-Snell residuals we propose a split sample test, as suggested in the
methodology section, to check if unmeasured confoundedness (endogeneity) is
still present in our youth model. The results are reported in Table 10. We
observe that while there are mostly non signicant results for the parameters
tested in the second sample, we still have a signicant result for the minutes
per game variable. This result may suggest some remaining unmeasured con-
foundedness is still present in the model. Therefore, we employ a DFM model
as suggested in the methodology, with the results presented in Table 11. The
discrete mixtures hazard results for the youth model indicate that unobserved
heterogeneity of players is present in the model in the form of two types (type 1
players representing around 33% of the sample, and type 2 players representing
around 67% of the sample). There are many unobservables that could drive
this result, including playersnatural ability or talent level, e¤ort level and de-
termination, intelligence or human capital that is a necessary complement to
talent at the top level of European soccer, etc. The estimated hazard for type 2
players is far more stable than its counterpart for type 1 players, and it appears
that these type 1 players drive the exit rate throughout the analysis, as evident
in Figure 4. The volatility of the hazard rate for type 1 players signals that
their type is most frequently replaced at the top level. Considering the presence
of unobservable heterogeneity in the results, type 1 players might be of lower
natural ability, human capital, or simply dont possess the drive and determi-
nation to succeed at that level for an extended period of time. Young players in
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soccer have the highest attrition rate among all players. Oshor Williams of the
Professional Footballers Associations (PFA) education department, which of-
fers support and training to prepare them for a life outside professional football,
stated in an interview for BBC Sport:23
"Of those entering the game aged 16, two years down the line, 50% will be
outside professional football. If we look at the same cohort at 21, the attrition
rate is 75% or above."
Our results might have very well identied those players from this cohort
that survived past age 21 as type 2 players, which represent 67% of the sample
at hand. The remaining players of type 1 probably fall in the category of players
described by Mr. Williams that exit between the ages of 18 and 21, having in
mind that our data is comprised of players that were signed professionally at 18
and survived the rst axe that resulted in 50% of players exiting the professional
game. Granted, this article considers players that drop out of professional soccer
altogether, rather than the top European leagues considered in our analysis.
Nevertheless, the overlap could be quite signicant and it quite possibly sheds
light on the identication of two types of players that are evident in our results.
Perhaps there exists an unobservable threshold level of player talent, human
capital, and e¤ort (among other unobservables) that di¤erentiates the two types
of players, in terms of survival at the top level, and leads to their identication
in the discrete hazard results.
Finally, the empirical analysis with the DFM results in the signicance of the
Bosman dummy variable. This signicant negative result in the hazard suggests
that the youth players that were hired post-Bosman are having longer careers
than their pre-Bosman counterparts. Considering that the Bosman ruling has
a negative e¤ect on youth/internal hiring, this result indicates that the fewer
number of hires in the post-Bosman period are of higher quality, which is nec-
essary to succeed in the more competitive environment after the ruling. The
ltering of talent from the internal (youth) channel seems to have improved in
response to the more competitive post-Bosman environment. These additional
results obtained with the DFM model are providing new insights on the role of
the unobservables, when they are properly accounted for, in the analysis. The
graphical representation of the DFM model in Figure 4 also suggest that DFM
model has better predictive ability of the data than the Cox PH model.
232014 online article published by BBC Sport: http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/28950665.
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7 Conclusion
This paper establishes a connection between relevant labor theory and the hir-
ing/promotion decisions of English Premier League clubs, when it comes to
o¤ering rst-team opportunities to new and unproven players. Two proprietary
data sets are combined to address the research questions at hand, using a se-
quential econometric approach that addresses multiple issues. More reputable
clubs in terms of producing higher-quality youth players display a higher degree
of bottom-heaviness, and as such provide more opportunities for their youth
players through internal promotion. These results are consistent in the wake of
the Bosman case ruling, which certainly had an e¤ect on clubsdecision making
process. Unsurprisingly, foreign sourced players increased their presence in the
league signicantly after the removal of the foreign player quota, and became the
dominant stream for acquisition of new players. Better ranked, or nancially su-
perior, clubs had a higher probability of selecting foreign players, which speaks
to their ability to re-allocate their internal resources more e¢ ciently towards
foreign-player scouting than smaller (lower-ranked) clubs when accounting for
the Bosman ruling.
In addition to the main results and objectives, the survival analysis in this
paper upholds the results established in Radoman and Voia (2015) and demon-
strates that the best-ranked youth programs in that paper consistently out-
perform the others in terms of career duration of their youth products in this
narrower sample that controls for the Bosman ruling. Unobserved heterogene-
ity is statistically signicant at the parent youth-club level, rather than at the
player level, which lends further support to the notion that each youth academy
has di¤erential ability in schoolingtheir players at the youth level that plays
an important role in the careers of otherwise homogeneous players. When the
unobserved heterogeneity is modelled using discrete nite mixtures we get new
insights on the role of the unobservables in the analysis. In particular two types
of players are identied in the data, one type that represent 33% is the one that
drives the exits of the youth players. Also, this model shows that Bosman ruling
positively impacts the career duration of youth players, that signals a rened
ltering process by parent clubs in response to competitive pressure arising from
the institutional change, having in mind that the ruling had a negative e¤ect
on youth player selection.
One of the limitations of this data is that it does not account for all of
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the youth players under contract in the clubs examined. This sort of detail,
which could become possible and accessible in future years with improvements
in data availability, would aid in providing a more reasonable assessment of
bottom-heavinessof clubs and better address their probability of promoting
from within. Such an analysis can be extended to other sports that are struc-
tured in a similar fashion, like European basketball or hockey in North America.
The internal vs. external hiring decisions and associated labor economics the-
ories have signicant potential to be empirically tested further in the sports
economy sector.
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Table 1: Breakdown by Source
Variables Pre-Bosman Post-Bosman
Ythrank Domestic Youth Foreign Domestic Youth Foreign
1 16 40 17 9 35 63
2 14 15 18 13 22 60
3 28 44 22 28 26 55
4 73 48 22 60 66 63
Position
G 11 6 4 13 7 19
D 48 45 24 44 56 73
M 34 66 28 32 49 75
F 38 30 23 21 37 74
Clubrank
Top 7 32 34 24 15 43 89
8-15 42 62 26 47 56 91
Bottom 5 57 51 29 48 50 61
Table 2: Youth Breakdown by International Experience
Pre-Bosman Post-Bosman
Ythrank Yes No Yes No
1 20 20 18 17
2 4 11 9 13
3 10 34 11 15
4 11 37 33 33
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Table 3: Probit Results for Youth Selection
M1 M2 M3
Youthranking - 1 is the benchmark
2 -.42 -.37 -.42
(.15) (.17) (.17)
3 -.22 -.25 -.41
(.13) (.15) (.16)
4 -.19 -.37 -.42
(.12) (.14) (.13)
forshare -.009 .05 .05
(.005) (.01) (.01)
Position - Goalie is the benchmark
defence .42 .45 .45
(.20) (.22) (.22)
mideld .54 .59 .60
(.20) (.22) (.22)
forward .25 .33 .34
(.20) (.23) (.23)
Bosman -.94 -.95
(.28) (.28)
Inter. Exp. - no exp. is the benchmark
1 (Senior) -2.26 -2.27
(.27) (.27)
2 (Junior) .31 .30
(.11) (.11)
Const. -.23 -1.83 -1.79
(.29) (.52) (.52)
Observations 857 857 857
Log Likelihood -540.18 -420.91 -418.74
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistical signicance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
Table 4: Goodness of Fit
Variable Mean (M3) St. Dev. (M3) Mean (M2) St. Dev. (M2)
Youth Selection (actual) .3442 .4754 .3442 .4754
Fitted prob. of youth selection .3448 .2346 .3447 .2322
Table 5: Link Test for Misspecication - Youth
Youth Selection Coe¢ cient (M3) Coe¢ cient (M2)
Prediction 1.11 1.11
(.16) (.17)
Prediction squared .07 .06
(.08) (.08)
Note: *** indicates statistical signicance at 0.01 level
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Table 6: Predicted Probability Analysis
Youth (A) Foreign (B) Multinomial (C)
Ythrank Margin (M3) Team rank Margin (M2) Ythrank Margin (M2)
1 .34 1 .45 1 .31
(.04) (.04) (.05)
2 .20 2 .34 2 .18
(.04) (.04) (.04)
3 .20 3 .30 3 .22
(.04) (.03) (.05)
4 .19 4 .21
(.03) (.04)
Table 7: Probit Results for Foreign Selection
M1 M2
Team ranking - 1 is the benchmark
2 -.36 -.28
(.13) (.15)
3 -.59 -.39
(.13) (.15)
Age .20 .14
(.01) (.02)
Position - Goalie is the benchmark
def .20 -.03
(.21) (.22)
mid .44 .14
(.21) (.22)
for .60 .25
(.21) (.23)
Bosman .64 .35
(.10) (.12)
Transfer Value 2.96e-07
(5.53e-08)
Inter. Exp. - no exp. is the benchmark
1 (Senior) 1.42
(.15)
2 (Junior) .17
(.14)
Const. -5.44 -4.33
(.41) (.48)
Obs. 857 857
Log Likelihood -409.01 -311.45
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistical signicance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
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Table 8: Multinomial Logit Results
M1 M2
Base - Domestic Source
Youth Source
Youthranking - 1 is the benchmark
2 -.79 (.36) -.87 (.34)
3 -.83 (.31) -1.12 (.31)
4 -1.20 (.30) -1.33 (.29)
Team ranking - 1 is the benchmark
2 -.18 (.25) -.05 (.25)
3 -.17 (.27) -.02 (.27)
Inter. exp. - no exp. is the benchmark
1 (senior) -2.86 (.74) -2.84 (.74)
2 (junior) .55 (.22) .52 (.22)
Position - Goalie is the benchmark
D .71 (.39) .73 (.50)
M 1.12 (.40) 1.14 (.40)
F .72 (.41) .74 (.41)
forshare .11 (.03) .11 (.03)
Bosman -1.69 (.50) -1.71 (.50)
constant -3.40 (.95) -3.44 (.94)
Foreign Source
Youthranking - 1 is the benchmark
2 -.26 (.37) -.23 (.36)
3 -.99 (.35) -1.05 (.35)
4 -1.47 (.33) -1.47 (.33)
Team ranking - 1 is the benchmark
2 -.42 (.27) -.30 (.28)
3 -.22 (.30) -.11 (.31)
Inter. exp. - no exp. is the benchmark
1 (senior) 2.46 (.26) 2.47 (.26)
2 (junior) .13 (.27) .12 (.27)
Position - Goalie is the benchmark
D .02 (.40) .03 (.40)
M .40 (.41) .41 (.41)
F .41 (.41) .42 (.41)
forshare .08 (.03) .08 (.03)
Bosman -.22 (.48) -.25 (.48)
constant -2.84 (.97) -2.97 (.97)
Log Likelihood -680 -677
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistical signicance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
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Table 9: Cox Semiparametric Survival Results
M1 M2 M3
Youthrank .81 .74 .63
(.07) (.06) (.11)
Apps .96 .96 .96
(.007) (.007) (.01)
Intapps .83 .84 .71
(.06) (.06) (.12)
Mpg .994 .993 .993
(.002) (.002) (.003)
Goals .87 .87 .88
(.04) (.03) (.06)
Yellow 1.07 1.07 1.09
(.03) (.03) (.06)
Bosman 1.04 1.03 1.11
(.08) (.08) (.13)
Player Position - Goalie is the benchmark
Defence .66 .68 .53
(.14) (.15) (.16)
Mideld .64 .66 .44
(.14) (.15) (.14)
Forward .81 .82 .56
(.18) (.19) (.19)
 .06
(.05)
Obs. 1537 1537 938
Log Likelihood -1944 -1941 -1349
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistical signicance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
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Table 10: Split Sample Endogeneity Test
Coe¢ cients Standard Error
Youthrank -0.039 0.058
Apps 0.001 0.004
Mpg -0.003 0.002
Intapps 0.019 0.016
Goals 0.004 0.011
Yellow -0.001 0.014
Defence 0.245 0.183
Mideld 0.146 0.187
Forward 0.185 0.199
Bosman -0.056 0.056
Constant 0.864 0.213
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistical signicance based on p-values at the 0.1, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 11: Discrete Mixtures Hazard Model
Coe¢ cients Standard Error
Youthrank -0.693 0.223
Apps -0.063 0.015
Mpg -0.002 0.004
Intapps -0.308 0.196
Goals -0.103 0.095
Yellow 0.005 0.078
Defence -0.244 0.478
Mideld -0.812 0.510
Forward -0.425 0.519
Bosman 0.457 0.216
Constant 0.324 0.572
M2 (cons) -15.44 455.17
Logitp2 (cons) -0.691 0.181
Prob. Type 1 = 0.33
Prob. Type 2 = 0.67
Log-Likelihood = -416
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistical signicance based on p-values at the 0.1, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: Smoothed Empirical Hazards
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Figure 2: Cox Baseline Hazard Estimates
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Figure 3: Cox Estimated Hazards
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Figure 4: Dicrete Mixtures vs Cox SP Hazards
38
